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REHABILITATION ACT-CALL IT AID, CALL IT HELP,
BUT DON'T CALL IT "FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE":
SHOTZ V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
THEODORE M. FOSTER*
D OES THE GOVERNMENT provide federal financial assis-
tance when it showers millions of dollars on a company
struggling to stay in business? _'While the answer may seem like
an obvious "yes," the Eleventh Circuit twisted words and prece-
dent to answer "no" in Shotz v. American Airlines, Inc.,' where it
ruled that American Airlines, Inc. ("American") and nine other
defendants were not subject to the anti-discrimination measures
of the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 ("Rehabilitation Act"), despite
having collectively received $3.7 billion in federal grants.3 The
court held that an entity receives "Federal financial assistance"4
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act only when it is the
intent of Congress to provide a subsidy. Furthermore, the
court found that the grants and loan guarantees provided to pri-
vate airline companies by the Air Transportation Safety and Sys-
tem Stabilization Act6 ("Stabilization Act"), passed in response
to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, were compensation,
not subsidies, and therefore the aid did not oblige the airlines to
comply with the Rehabilitation Act.7 Despite the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's strenuous assertions to the contrary, their ruling is flawed
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2007; B.S., Chemical Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin, with high
honors, 2000. The author thanks his partner Gary Majors for his love and
support.
1 420 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2005).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
3 Amended Complaint 7, Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1315
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (No. 04-20372-CIV) [hereinafter Complaint].
4 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
5 Shotz, 420 F.3d at 1335.
6 Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2005)) [hereinafter Stabilization Act].
Shotz, 420 F.3d at 1336.
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because it ignores the plain text of the two statutes and Con-
gress' intent.
In January 2004, Lynda Enders flew on American from Austin,
Texas, to Orlando, Florida, with a layover in Dallas/Ft. Worth,
Texas.8 Ms. Enders has partial paralysis of the left side of her
body, caused by a stroke in 1967, and she uses an electric
scooter and a service dog to assist her in walking. 9 Ms. Enders
alleged that American violated her rights by discriminating
against her and subjecting her to inferior treatment because of
her disability.10 Specifically, Ms. Enders alleged, inter alia, that
American disassembled her electric scooter, refused to assist her
in boarding, forced her to walk to her connecting gate, refused
to assist her with her luggage, and damaged her electric
scooter." Ms. Enders further alleged that aircraft operated by
American did not comply with federal requirements for accessi-
ble aisle seats, movable aisle armrests, accessible lavatories, and
accessible bulkhead rows.12
Endersjoined seventeen other individuals with disabilities in a
putative class action lawsuit charging American Airlines and
nine other air carriers with violating the Rehabilitation Act. 13
The plaintiffs alleged that the air carriers were subject to the
Rehabilitation Act, which applies only to programs and services
receiving "Federal financial assistance," because the air carriers
accepted cash payments and loan guarantees provided under
the Stabilization Act.14 The defendant air carriers responded
with a joint motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b) (1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and 12(b) (6)





12 Id. 53 (KKK)-(PPP). Because bulkhead rows have no seats in front of
them, they provide more space for passengers with disabilities and their service
animals. Enders alleged that American replaced regulation-compliant aircraft
with aircraft having emergency exits at the bulkhead rows, thereby restricting
these commodious seats to non-disabled passengers. Id. 1 53 (NNN).
13 Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 420 F.3d 1332, 1334 (lth Cir. 2005).
14 Id. Plaintiffs later conceded that Department of Transportation regulations
exempted the loan guarantees from consideration as "Federal financial assis-
tance." See Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of TheirJoint Motion to
Dismiss at 5, Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(No. 04-20372-CIV); see also 49 C.F.R. § 27.5 (2006) ("Federal financial assistance
means any grant, loan, contract (other than . . . a contract of insurance or guar-
anty).") (emphasis added).
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(failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).15
The air carriers argued that cash payments received under the
Stabilization Act were not "Federal financial assistance," and,
therefore, the Rehabilitation Act was inapplicable to them."
The trial court agreed and granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the case, 7 and the plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit."
The Eleventh Circuit faced the question of whether the defen-
dant airlines were subject to the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Rehabilitation Act by virtue of having accepted billions of
dollars from the federal government as compensation for lost
income due to the September 11 terror attacks. 9 In finding
that the airlines were not subject to the Rehabilitation Act, the
Eleventh Circuit relied principally on two prior cases that ad-
dressed the issue of when federal money triggers the Rehabilita-
tion Act: Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc.20 and DeVargas v. Mason &
Hanger-Silas Mason Co.21
The courts in Jacobson and DeVargas divided federal money
into two categories: subsidies, which trigger the provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act, and compensation, which does not. 2 2 Citing
the repeated use of the words compensate and compensation in the
Stabilization Act and its implementing regulations, the Eleventh
Circuit found that Congress' unambiguous intent was to com-
pensate air carriers, not to provide them with a subsidy.23 In
response to the plaintiffs' contention that the funds were not
compensation because the federal government received nothing
in return, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's state-
ment that "whether [d] efendants performed services in this case
in exchange for funds they received is irrelevant. '24 The court
was similarly dismissive of the idea that the word assistance has a
15 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of TheirJoint Motion to Dismiss at 3,
Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (No. 04-20372-
civ).




2o 742 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).
21 911 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1990).
22 DeVargas, 911 F.2d at 1382; Jacobson, 742 F.2d at 1210.
23 Shotz, 420 F.3d at 1336; see also Stabilization Act § 101; 14 C.F.R. §§ 330.1,
330.9, 330.11 (2005).
24 Shotz, 420 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2004)).
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common meaning in both the Rehabilitation Act and the Stabi-
lization Act, calling the argument "without merit. ' 25 Fixating on
Congress' use of the word compensate, the court ruled that the
defendants were not subject to the Rehabilitation Act. 26
Admittedly, Jacobson and DeVargas were important precedents
for this decsision, and a brief review of their facts is instructive. 27
In Jacobson, the Ninth Circuit held that payments to Delta Air-
lines for transporting mail did not include a subsidy and there-
fore were not "Federal financial assistance. '28 Although the
court could have determined the presence of a subsidy by com-
paring the payments to the fair market value of the services ren-
dered, the Ninth Circuit eschewed this approach as
unnecessarily complex and burdensome for the courts because
the fair market value would fluctuate, and the applicability of
the civil rights provisions might change at any time. 29 The
Ninth Circuit adopted what it considered a better approach: in-
quiring "whether the government intended to provide assistance
or merely to compensate."3
While payments for carrying the mail were compensation,
dicta in Jacobson indicated that federal grants made to en-
courage air carriers to provide services to small communities did
constitute "Federal financial assistance."3 1 The court stated that
because the Rehabilitation Act applies only to programs and ser-
vices receiving federal money, "Delta's receipt of such payments
at most subjects only the small community service program to
the civil rights laws."3 2
In DeVargas, the government expected to save approximately
$3.5 million by replacing government guards with private em-
ployees and after a competitive bidding process awarded the
contract to the lowest bidder.3 3 Not wanting to "scrutinize the
fair market value of every transaction as if [they] were article III
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1336.
27 It is notable that the Eleventh Circuit did not discuss the facts of Jacobson
and DeVargas. Any such discussion would have revealed that the court was apply-
ing those precedents far out of context. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text.





33 DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1382 (10th
Cir. 1990).
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accountants, ''s4 the Tenth Circuit followed Jacobson and looked
to the government's intent in paying the contractor)5 Payments
made under the contract were compensation, as the govern-
ment entered into the contract in circumstances showing that
"there was no governmental intent to give [the contractor] a
subsidy.""
With these precedents in mind, we turn back to Shotz. Proper
statutory construction always begins with the plain text of the
statute. 7 The Eleventh Circuit effectively skipped this step, not-
ing only that the Rehabilitation Act does not define "Federal
financial assistance."3 The court then adopted the DeVargas
definition of assistance as "a subsidy" and carried out its analysis
as if the Rehabilitation Act used the word subsidy.39 But the Re-
habilitation Act applies when an entity receives "Federal finan-
cial assistance,'"4 not a federal subsidy. Congress provided funds
in the Stabilization Act to assist the struggling airline industry in
an attempt to avert massive bankruptcies.4 1 The Stabilization
Act itself refers to the federal grants as "assistance" in a later
section. 42 Both supporters and detractors of the Stabilization
Act characterized the bill as "federal assistance"43 and "financial
assistance to the airlines. Thus, the funds given under the
Stabilization Act fall within the plain meaning of "Federal finan-
cial assistance," and the Rehabilitation Act should have applied
to the recipients of those funds.
Not only did the Eleventh Circuit fail to analyze the statutory
text before adopting another court's interpretation, but it also
failed to appreciate the reasoning behind the compensation/
subsidy distinction. Jacobson looked to whether Congress in-
3, Id.
.5 Id.
'6 Id. at 1382-83.
37 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
31 Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 420 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005).
'I" See id. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit was fond of editing Congress' works so
as to avoid dealing the plain text of statutes, at one point quoting the Rehabilita-
tion Act for the phrase "federal financial aid." See id. at 1338 (emphasis added).
40 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
41 See Stabilization Act Preamble ("An Act To preserve the continued viability
of the United States air transportation system.").
42 Stabilization Act § 106(a) (ordering the president to report to Congress on
"the amounts of assistance provided . . . to each air carrier").
43 147 CONG. Rr( . H5912 (2001) (statement of Rep. Reyes).
44 Id. at H5913 (statement of Sen. Bentsen); id. (statement of Rep. Waxman);
see alo id. at H5910 (Sen. Kilpatrick voting against what she termed a "financial
assistance package").
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tended to subsidize the airline only because the more direct
method of determining whether the defendant received federal
financial assistance-comparing the federal payments to the
market value of the services provided-was judicially unwieldy,
and the result would fluctuate with market forces.45 There is no
difficulty determining the value of the services provided to the
government in the present case, nor is there any fluctuation in
value over time; no services were rendered to the government,
and therefore, the market value is zero. The payments in this
case are like the payments made in Jacobson to encourage the
provision of air service to small communities, payments that the
Ninth Circuit indicated would trigger the Rehabilitation Act.46
Even if the Eleventh Circuit was correct to ignore the statutory
text and to focus on the compensation/subsidy distinction, the
Rehabilitation Act still should have applied because the pay-
ments were in fact subsidies. A subsidy is "[a] grant, usually
made by the government, to any enterprise whose promotion is
considered to be in the public interest."47 No bright line divides
compensation from subsidy, and indeed a single payment could
be both.48 Unlike in DeVargas, the government did not use any
competitive bidding process to ensure that it gave out no more
than necessary. Indeed, there was nothing to bid on. The gov-
ernment had no obligation to make up any income lost because
of the September 11 terror attacks, and it did not for most busi-
nesses affected by September 11. The Stabilization Act gave the
airlines a new right to payment for those losses because Con-
gress believed that promoting the companies was in the public
interest. The form and substance of the payments meet the
plain definition of a subsidy, and thus, even under the rubric of
Jacobson and DeVargas, the Rehabilitation Act should have
applied.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit failed to consider the intent of
Congress in enacting the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation
Act's goal is "providing individuals with disabilities with the tools
necessary to . . . achieve . . . full inclusion and integration in
45 SeeJacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1984).
46 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
47 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1469 (8th ed. 2004); see also id. at 719 (defining
grant as "[a] n agreement that creates a right of any description other than the
one held by the grantor").
48 See Jacobson, 742 F.2d at 1210 (referencing a government chart showing
"whether or not each such air carrier receives a section 406 subsidy" as part of its
payment for transporting mail).
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society. '49 Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act to enforce
"the policy of the United States that all programs, projects, and
activities receiving assistance .. .be carried out in a manner
consistent with the principles of. .. inclusion, integration, and
full participation of the individuals [with disabilities] . In
short, Congress did not want to force taxpayers to fund pro-
grams that discriminated against them. By ruling that the defen-
dant airlines can use federal funding to finance operations that
discriminate against taxpayers with disabilities, the court ignores
Congress' intent in passing the Rehabilitation Act.
Had the Eleventh Circuit made a factual comparison between
Shotz and the cases it cited, the court would have had difficulty
reaching its conclusion. Instead, the court ignored the text of
the Rehabilitation Act, focused on a single word in the Stabiliza-
tion Act, and summarily concluded that Congress did not subsi-
dize the airline industry. Perhaps the court's best argument for
affirming dismissal was that it would have been inconsistent for
Congress, in extending billions of dollars of aid to the airlines,
simultaneously to open them up to billions of dollars of new
litigation.5" But the Rehabilitation Act makes no exceptions for
situations where it would be expensive or politically unpopular
to enforce its provisions, and the defendant airlines were free to
decline the funds. Four years after the events of September 11,
2001, the airline industry remains in poor financial condition.52
The court may have felt that it had no politically viable option
except to affirm, but politics provide no excuse for suspending
the ordinary and routine decision-making process.
49 29 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (6) (B) (2000).
50 Id. § 701 (c).
51 Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 420 F.3d 1332, 1337 (lth Cir. 2005).
52 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard et al., Bankruptcy for 2: Storm Broke The Camel's
Back; Delta's Filing Was Not Unexpected, But Northwest Had Hoped to Hold Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at Cl.
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